21.7%, 43.3% and 86.7% respectively). While clearly government debt and consumer credit played an important role, perhaps a more significant question for the medieval economy concerned the interest rates charged for commercial credit, particularly for merchants looking to fund trade.
The most sophisticated method used by merchants to disguise interest was based on foreign exchange (hereafter FX) transactions and bills of exchange. While the theological basis for this exemption has been discussed in depth (Noonan, 1957; Langholm, 1992) , there has been surprisingly little quantitative work using this source. This paper will show how the relatively voluminous surviving records about exchange rates in the middle ages can help to illuminate the much murkier question of medieval interest rates. We will first explain how the medieval FX market operated and its links to the money market. Next, we will set out the sources of our data on medieval exchange rates, the methodology for calculating interest rates from these exchange rates and provide our results for some key financial centres. These will be used to answer two fundamental questions: first, did the relationship between exchange rates include an element of interest and could FX transactions therefore be used to circumvent the usury prohibition?
Second, what were the levels of interest charged on commercial loans in the Middle Ages and how did these compare to rates on government debt and consumer credit? We will also explore some distinctive seasonal patterns in these interest rates at different financial centres and show how these relate to wider trade flows. Finally, we will consider the significance of our findings for the current debate over whether there was a long-term halving of the risk-free interest rate after c.1350.
The FX market in medieval Europe
Today, FX is the largest financial market, as the globalisation of trade and finance necessitates conversion between the different currencies of sovereign nation-states or currency areas. The sheer scale of the modern FX market may be unprecedented, but its origins can be traced back at least to medieval Europe. The rise of kingdoms and principalities (many of which would form the basis for today's nation-states), each asserting a monopoly on minting coins within its territory, combined with the 'Commercial Revolution' of the thirteenth century, led to an increase in cross-border trade and thus the need for FX (Einzig, 1970) . This was carried out on a local scale by money-changers and on an international level by (mainly Italian) merchant societies. The significance of FX was even recognised in medieval literature, with Chaucer writing of his archetypal merchant, 'wel coude he in eschaunge sheeldes selle' (Riverside Chaucer, General prologue, line 278). The écu (sheelde) was a Flemish unit of account, equal to 24 silver pence groot. Chaucer's merchant was selling bills of exchange payable in écus in Flanders in return for pounds sterling upfront in England. In effect, he was borrowing in England, most likely in order to fund purchases of goods for export, and making repayment in Flanders, possibly with the money received from selling the exported goods.
The operation of the medieval exchange rate system was set out by Raymond de Roover in a series of seminal monographs and articles (de Roover, 1944 (de Roover, , 1957 (de Roover, , 1966 (de Roover, , 1968 . Subsequently, Guilio Mandich (1970) made some important adjustments to the de Roover thesis (the most accessible discussion in English can be found in Mueller, 1997) . The classic FX instrument was the bill of exchange, an informal holograph 'order to pay'. In essence, the writer of the bill in place A ordered his correspondent in place B to pay a sum in the local currency there to a third party, for value received by the writer. In its fullest form, the bill stated that the seller (usually known as the taker or drawer) of the bill had received a sum of money in the local currency from the buyer (the giver or remitter) in place A. The seller ordered his correspondent (the payer) in place B to pay the equivalent value in the foreign currency, at a set exchange rate, to the buyer's correspondent (the payee). There were a bewildering number of variations; the seller and payer could be the same person, as in the above case of Chaucer's merchant, or the buyer and payee, where the buyer was purchasing a 'traveller's cheque' to take abroad. More confusingly, the named buyer and seller (or payee and payer) could be the same person; this was common in the case of merchant societies who could 'pay money to themselves' or 'receive money from themselves' by adjusting their customers' credit and debit balances on their account books.
There was always a time lag between the issue of a bill of exchange and its settlement. In large part, this resulted from the slower speed of medieval communications which meant that information took days or weeks to be transmitted between financial centres. The greater the distance between the two places, the longer the time lag. In addition, most exchange transactions had standardised maturities (the usance period), roughly varying with the distance.
The shortest usance period was between Florence and Pisa, where bills were payable three days after they were presented for payment. The longest was between London and the Italian cities, where bills matured three months after they were issued or drawn. Notably, usance was always longer than the communication time. This may initially have developed from the requirements of trade -Chaucer's merchant needed time to ship his goods from London to Flanders and market them in order to raise the cash to settle the bill of exchange -but it was soon incorporated into the financial system to create loans of varying lengths.
This meant that every bill of exchange necessarily involved the extension of credit. The seller of a bill of exchange was effectively a borrower, and the buyer the lender. In order for the bill of exchange to function effectively as a credit instrument, however, there needed to be some way of compensating the lender for the time value of their money -i.e. of paying interest. In effect, this was incorporated into the exchange rates at places A and B. This helps to explain one of the key features of medieval exchange rates, which may appear peculiar to modern eyes, namely that the same currency pair was quoted at different rates at each end of the transaction. In the sixteenth century, for instance, the exchange rate between the pound sterling and the Flemish pond groot (as quoted in pence sterling per pond groot) was almost invariably higher in London than in Antwerp.
1 As the report of a royal commission into FX in 1564 explained:
There is good reason why the Exchange at Antwerp goeth about 4d flemish lower at usance than the price of the Exchange is in Lombard street, for by the Exchange at Antwerp the pound English being the valuer as not paid for and answered until a month after the delivery of Flemish money for the same, and by Exchange in Lombard street the pound English being the valuer is paid a month before the delivery of his value in Flemish money for the same. So that when the English pound is paid for a month before hand, then the price thereof in reason ought to be the less; and when the English pound is not paid for in Flemish money until a month after hand, then the price in reason ought to be the more. But hear you may perceive that this necessary and fair name Exchange might be truly termed by the odious name of buying and selling of money for time, otherwise called usury.
Memorandum prepared for the Royal Commission on the Exchanges (1564).
The use of bills of exchange as pure credit instruments therefore required not one transaction but two. The first was the outgoing bill of exchange. The second was a rechange operation by which the value payable was returned back to the place of origin. The buyer of a bill of exchange's profits (and thus the interest rate) resulted from the differential between the exchange rate at place A when the bill was originated and the exchange rate at place B when the bill was rechanged.
This can best be demonstrated in practice. In Venice on 26 September 1442, Francesco Venier and bros. sold a bill of exchange for 150 ducats to Cosimo di Medici and company, payable in London at usance (three months) at the rate of 44½ pence sterling per ducat. Venier received the money (possibly in cash but more likely in a bank credit) in Venice and gave the bill of exchange to Medici, who sent it to his correspondents in London to be presented for payment to
Venier's correspondents, where they should have received £27 16s 3d (6,675d). When they presented the bill, however, on 31 December 1442, Venier's correspondents refused to pay (possibly by prior agreement with Medici but not necessarily) and the bill was rechanged back to
Venice to be settled after a second three-month usance period. Importantly, this second exchange transaction took place at the exchange rate prevailing in London on 31 December, which was 41¼ pence sterling. As a result, Venier owed Medici not the original 150 ducats, but just under 162 ducats. In effect, Venier had borrowed 150 ducats for six months and paid 11 ducats 16 solidi in interest. This set of transactions is summarised in figure 1.
INSERT FIGURE 1
The buyer/lender's profit was determined by the difference, or spread, in the exchange rates between the two exchange centres; the wider the spread, the greater the profit. The conversion of the profit received into an annualized interest rate will depend on the usance period between the two places. In the above example, the exchange and rechange transaction lasted for six months and the annualized interest rate (non-compounded) was 15.8%. It may be thought that producing and maintaining these spreads would have required the systematic 'rigging' of exchange rates across Europe (a medieval parallel to the recent LIBOR and FX scandals). In the example above, the merchant societies and FX brokers in London always had to deduct a few pence from the 'par' rate with Venice, and their counterparts in Venice to add a few pence.
However, there is no evidence in the voluminous surviving mercantile correspondence of any overt price fixing (unlike the e-mail servers of modern banks). Rather, the differences in exchange rates formed spontaneously in response to the inherent economic logic of the situation.
This inbuilt spread resulting from the time value of money was not, however, the only factor influencing exchange rate movements. Since bills of exchange were used both to transfer funds for trade and also to borrow or lend money, exchange rates were closely linked to the wider condition of the money market. The pattern of international trade resulted in more or less regular seasonal flows of money from one centre to another, with obvious implications for exchange rates. Equally, less predictable events, such as war or political unrest, could also have a significant impact. In addition, government intervention could also affect exchange rates, particularly in terms of the debasement or enhancement of the currency. The sixteenth-century merchant Bernardo Davanzati explained this relationship using the analogy of a hand tightening or loosening its grip on money (Mueller, 1997, p.305) . At times of high demand for cash, the hand would tighten and not release any money except at a higher price (in terms of foreign currency). As a result, the local currency would appreciate, that is, sellers of bills of exchange (borrowers) would have to promise more foreign currency to receive one unit of local currency. 7
In this situation, merchants described money as being 'tight' (strettazza) or 'dear' (carestia). If the supply of money exceeded the demand, money was 'loose' (larghezza) or 'abundant ' (dovizia) and the local currency depreciated as buyers of bills of exchange (lenders) were prepared to accept less foreign currency per unit of local currency. According to Giovanni di Antonio da Uzzano (1442) , the 'good rule in making exchange' was to anticipate changes in exchange rates
and not merely to react to them. Just like today, a merchant's profits depended on his ability to predict market movements and to time his trades.
Importantly, the implicit interest rate could vary from transaction to transaction as the exchange rates reacted to the particular conditions of trade and the money market at each place. One important consequence of this system was that neither the lender nor the borrower in any specific exchange and rechange transaction could know the interest rate in advance. Although the existence of a spread between the exchange rates at the two financial centres meant that, on average and in the long run, the buyer/lender would receive a positive return, this could vary and, indeed, the buyer/lender could sometimes lose money on the transaction. The fact that there was no fixed or certain profit was, it has been argued, one of the main reasons why bills of exchange were not held to be usurious (de Roover, 1944) . Indeed, an important strand in the historical and economic literature has argued that the primary significance of bills of exchange was that they enabled merchants to circumvent the usury prohibition (Koyama, 2010; Rubin, 2010) .
The use of FX transactions to conceal loans in this way was called 'dry exchange' (cambium secco)
because it did not water the flows of trade. It could be carried out using protested bills of exchange, as may have been the case in the Venier example discussed above. A more efficient method was exchange senza lettera (without letters). Here the FX transactions were purely bookkeeping entries based on reported market rates at the second financial centre (Mandich, 1970; Mueller, 1997) . This avoided some of the fixed costs of sending and then protesting bills of exchange. Rather than 'real' FX transactions, these can be seen as derivatives contracts on future exchange rates. Alternatively, there were allegations of fictitious exchanges where the exchange rates were not based on market rates but agreed in advance. Of course, by making profits certain, this would have fallen foul of the usury prohibition.
Although the spreads between exchange rates at different financial centres clearly reflected the time value of money, this did not mean that bills of exchange were only or even primarily used to make loans. In his study of the Covoni account books, Mandich (1970) Instead, once that bill came due in Venice, they relied on their broker there to find a second counterparty, one who wanted money in Venice and could draw on funds in Florence. In this case, there was no guarantee that they would find a matching counterparty. In more complicated cases, the merchants may then have used the funds received from the bill in Venice to remit to a third market, such as Barcelona or Bruges. In this way, such speculators in exchange rates may actually have played a vital economic role by acting as counterparties for merchants wishing to transfer funds for trading purposes.
There is thus a certain tension between the role of the bill of exchange as a credit instrument and as a means of facilitating trade. It is certainly true that exchange trading made a major contribution to the profits of medieval merchant societies. Girolamo Biscaro (1913) found that and Mueller (1997) . For a later period, José Ruiz (2004) and Claudio Marsilio (2012) studied exchange transactions at the Besançon fairs in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. All of the preceding studies are based on surviving evidence from actual FX transactions recorded as bills of exchange or in merchants' account books and so rely on a fairly narrow and particular evidential base.
As explained above, the profits from FX trading were a product of differential exchange rates at both ends of the exchange and rechange transaction. Therefore, it should be possible to reconstruct implicit or potential interest rates even where we do not have actual transaction data, if we know the exchange rates at both places. Since successful FX trading involved predicting the future movements of exchange rates, the merchant who had better and more upto-date information about exchange rates in other banking centres enjoyed an advantage over his uninformed peers. For this reason, when writing to their correspondents in foreign centres, merchants often listed the current market exchange rates at the end of their commercial letters.
These rates were probably collected from the bill brokers that arranged deals in each city (de Roover, 1968, p.29) . They can be seen as forerunners of the exchange rate currents printed from the sixteenth century onwards (McCuster and Gravesteijn, 1991) , which ultimately developed into the modern financial press. The use of exchange rates from commercial correspondence has two main advantages. First, merchants wrote frequently to their correspondents (on a weekly or even daily basis) and often had correspondents in several different financial centres. This provides a greater depth and higher frequency of data than relying on the evidence of actual transactions. Second, the use of market rates may have stripped out some of the idiosyncratic factors that may have influenced the exchange rates used in particular transactions. This makes the data more useful for comparative purposes. In fact, where it is possible to compare the rates used in actual transactions with those quoted in merchants' letters, they are usually the same or very similar.
Booth ( (Origo, 1957; Melis, 1962; Nigro, 2010) . His branches (in capitals) and major correspondents are shown on figure 2.
Although his main business interests concentrated on the western Mediterranean, with an arc of branches stretching from Tuscany, Southern France and Spain, he was in touch with correspondents in Northern Europe (Bruges, London and Paris) and Eastern Italy (Milan, Venice).
Datini is still known today because many of the survival of many of his business records, including 600 account books and 150,000 items of correspondence. 2 These provide an unparalleled source for medieval economic and financial history.
INSERT FIGURE 2
2 Images of Datini's correspondence can be viewed online at http://datini.archiviodistato.prato.it/.
In the current paper we apply a variant of Booth's method to our greatly expanded FX dataset.
Summary data for the relevant exchange rates extracted from the Datini archive is shown in Thus, a rise in the quoted exchange rate reflects an increase in the value of currency B (which gave certain) but a decrease in the value of currency A (which gave uncertain). Conversely a fall would mean that currency A was appreciating in value while B was falling. As de Roover pointed out (repeatedly), the logic of the time value of money meant that the exchange rate at the place that gave certain should generally be higher than the rate at the place that gave uncertain.
The second method quoted rates as a percentage better (meglio) or worse (peggio) than par. 4 If, for example, the rate at Florence for the Genoese florin was at par, then the buyer of a bill of exchange for 100 Florentine florins in Florence would receive 100 Genoese florins in Genoa. If the rate was five better, then the same 100 Florentine florins would be worth 105 Genoese.
However, if it was five worse, then the buyer would have to pay 105 Florentine florins to receive 100 Genoese -not that 100 Florentine florins would equal 95 Genoese. 5 This method of quotation seems counter-intuitive but in fact it had a significant benefit. If the rate at Florence was five worse and that at Genoa was six better, then the merchant could quickly calculate the spread between the two rates by deducting the worse rate from the better. In this case, the spread would have been one per cent. In fact, this is similar to the first method with the stronger currency effectively giving 'certain' and the weaker currency 'uncertain'. However, the calculation was made much more complicated when the rates fluctuated either side of par.
One of the most important complicating factors involved the use of 'imaginary' moneys of account. For example, although exchange rates with Genoa and Milan were expressed in terms of the gold Genoese florin and the gold Milanese ducat respectively, in fact these gold coins represented a fixed number of local silver coins. The Genoese florin was equal to 25 silver soldi and the Milanese ducat to 32 silver soldi imperiali. Similarly, by the end of the fourteenth century, the French gold franc was used to refer to the silver livre tournois. In such cases, when the local silver coinage was debased, this caused the exchange rate to move. By far the most involved case is Bruges. In general, letters from Bruges quoted exchange rates in terms of a variable number of silver groats per foreign coin (i.e. Bruges gave uncertain). 6 The exceptions were Barcelona and London, both of which gave 'uncertain' to Bruges, although even here the former rate was expressed in terms of soldi and denari per écu of 22 groats whereas the latter used an écu of 24 groats. For rates quoted outside of Bruges, however, there was a great variety of different methods and they changed over time. Merchants at Barcelona and London used the same method as above. In Paris, Genoa, and Florence, rates were expressed as a percentage better or worse than par. Moreover, the imaginary coin used in these rates was not the same and 4 Note that some writers used meglio/peggio questi meaning that these (i.e. the local currency) was trading better/worse than par, while other writers used meglio/peggio quelli meaning that those (i.e. the foreign currency) was trading better/worse than par. Obviously these have opposite meanings and the shorthand employed by the merchants is not always as clear as might be hoped. 5 Mueller (1997) unfortunately confuses this issue. For the correct interpretation, see Heers (1961, p.78) . 6 In fact, in the very earliest surviving letter from Bruges, in 1384, the writer seems to have used a par system based on the imaginary gold real of 24 groats. changed over time. Initially, they seem to use a réal of 24 groats but this seems to have been changed to a franc of 42 groats after the devaluation of 1386, before settling at the franc of 33 groats after the devaluation of 1389. From 1411, after another re-valuation of the currency, merchants at Florence finally adopted the system used in Bruges and quoted the rate in terms of groats per florin. For this reason, in our dataset we have converted all such rates into groats per unit of foreign currency.
The next variable to consider is the usance period between any two financial centres, as shown in table 2. There were two distinct methods of specifying when a bill of exchange would mature. In the first, and simplest, the bill of exchange came due a set number of days after it was drawn. In the second, the bill was payable a set number of days after sight, i.e. after it was presented to the payer by the payee. This introduces a degree of unpredictability since the travel time between centres could vary. For example, Federigo Melis (1973) found that the average postal time between Bruges and Barcelona was 23 days, but the journey could be as short as 11 days or as long as 48 days. As the usance between the two was 30 days after sight, the length of any individual transfer could vary from 41 to 78 days. In fact, many of the actual bills of exchange from Bruges to Barcelona surviving in the Datini archive record the date on which the bill was accepted. From this, most bills were presented after 28 days. Moreover, a smaller number of bills fixed the usance period at 60 days from drawing. As a result, we have used 60 days as our standard duration for an FX transaction between Barcelona and Bruges, rather than the 53 days assumed by Booth (2009) .
INSERT TABLE 2
Another interesting feature is the asymmetry in usance periods between two centres depending on the direction of the transaction. For example, usance from Florence to Venice was five days after sight and, since the usual travel time between the two cities was five days, the standard usance period was ten days. Of course, if the bill was delayed, this could be lengthened. By contrast, usance from Venice to Florence was fixed at 20 days after drawing. In both directions, a complete exchange and rechange transaction would take thirty days but from Florence, the rechange rate (and thus the implicit interest rate) would be fixed after ten days while in Venice the rate would be fixed after twenty days. This could have significant effects on the resultant interest rates as the lender in Florence only had to predict the Venetian exchange rate in ten days' time, while his counterpart in Venice had to wait twice as long. As Mueller (1997) points out, the FX system was established by Florentine merchants for their own benefit. Similarly, usance from Genoa to Paris and Bruges was ten days after sight (plus average postal times of 18 and 24 days respectively) while from both Bruges and Paris to Genoa was 60 days from sight. 13 There is also conflicting evidence about the usance periods between Bruges and Paris. According to the merchant manual compiled by Uzzano shortly after our period, usance was ten days from sight (plus postal time of four days) in both directions. But the Ricci manual, compiled in the 1380s, gave both usance periods as 30 days from sight. Finally, a third manual split the difference, giving usance from Paris to Bruges as ten days from sight and Bruges-Paris as 30 days from drawing (de Roover, 1968) . The time taken for a complete change and rechange transaction could be 28, 44 or 60 days and this obviously has a major impact on the annualized interest rates, as reported below.
The fact that there were substantial was a considerable variety in usance periods between different financial centres also allowed for the construction of loans of differing maturities.
Exchange and rechange between two close centres, for example Florence and Venice or Florence and Genoa, produced a loan of roughly one month's duration. A longer term loan of four months could be engineered by engaging in an exchange and rechange transaction between Italy and Spain or Northern Europe and Spain. The longest loans, of six months, were between Genoa and
London. Loans could also be extended by immediately entering into another exchange and rechange transaction. Mueller (1997, pp .290-1 n.4) gives one example of a borrower who remained on the exchange for nearly two years. As noted above, the length of the usance periods in both directions needs to be taken into account when converting the spreads between the two exchange rates into an annualised interest rate.
Although our method is based on that of Booth (2009) , instead of looking at just one currency pair, we calculate interest rates for all currency pairs for which there is sufficient data in our dataset of exchange rates taken from the Datini archive. To illustrate the methodology, however, we will take the exchange between Florence and Venice (known as 'cambium ad Venetias') as an exemplar. Summary details are shown in table 3 and figure 3.
INSERT the relatively short usance periods between these two cities, it would not really be appropriate (or even necessary, given the amount of data from these two places and thus the number of matches returned by even restrictive assumptions) to extend the parameters further. For some of the more distant centres, however, we look for matches within up to seven days of the target date.
Second, we calculate the spread between these two rates. When exchange rates are quoted using the 'certain'/'uncertain' method, as in this case, the spread is calculated by deducting the rate at the place that gave uncertain (Florence) from that at the place that gave uncertain (Venice). This nominal spread can then be converted into a percentage value by dividing it by the rate at the uncertain place. Note that this applies regardless of the direction of the transaction.
(1)
Where the exchange rates are quoted as a percentage better or worse than par, the method is slightly different. As explained above, these rates are converted into the amount of foreign currency received per 100 units of local currency. In effect, both places give certain. The exchange rate at A thus represents the value received at place B. This is then multiplied by the rechange rate (the exchange rate at B) to calculate the sum received back at place A. Deducting the original 100 units that we started with at A produces the nominal spread, and this can be converted into percentage format by dividing by 100. *
For purposes of comparison, we convert the spread between the two rates -which represents the return from any one exchange and rechange transaction -into a simple annualized rate. In this case, even though the usance periods differed, the overall time taken for a complete exchange and rechange operation was the same in both cases, namely 30 days or roughly one month. We also calculate a compounded annualized interest rate based on the average spread.
As we shall see, interest rates followed definite seasonal patterns. For instance, interest rates at Venice peaked in August, when they approached 20-30% and bottomed out in the spring, at 5%-10%. Of course, it was not possible to lock in those rates for longer than one month. If the merchant kept his money running on the exchange for a year, his return would be the product of 12 separate monthly transactions rather than one transaction multiplied by 12.
The results are interesting. The average spread at Florence was between 0.80% and 0.84%, depending on the match parameters, while in Venice it was between 0.79% and 0.82%. When these are converted into simple annualized rates, those for Florence range from 9.76% to 10.22%
and Venice from 9.73% to 10.00%. Taking into account compounding, these rates increase slightly but the overall picture remains the same. Both the spreads and the annualized interest rates are very similar whether the FX transaction originated in Florence or in Venice. Although the implied interest rates are similar, the distribution of these returns differed in significant ways.
This can be seen visually in figure 3 or in the standard deviations reported in table 3. There is a greater variation in the implied interest rates at Venice as compared to Florence. This may reflect the fact that the return rate was fixed after 20 days in bills of exchange from Venice but only 10 days from Florence. There were also important differences in the seasonality of the implied interest rates at the two centres, as we shall discuss below.
The first requirement is that we have exchange rate observations from both centres at the two ends of the currency pair. For example, Florence quoted Bruges, London and Paris but none of those three places quoted rates for Florence and therefore it is not possible to calculate interest rates using the exchange and rechange method. As a result, our dataset has been reduced to 14 currency pairs from seven different financial centres (and thus 28 sets of implicit interest rates).
The results for all our locations and currency pairs are shown in table 4.
INSERT TABLE 4
Obviously the spreads between the currency pairs differ widely, from around 0.8% between Florence, Genoa and Venice all the way up to 6.9% from Genoa to London. However, once the implicit interest rates are annualized taking into account the different usance periods, as explained above, they fall into a much more consistent band ranging between 9-10% and 15-16%. There is some indication of an upwardly-sloping yield curve as the longer term loans generally have higher interest rates than the shortest term loans.
Such rates are broadly comparable with other indications of the cost of credit at this time. The interest rates paid on time deposits (deposito a discrezione) at Florence varied between 6% and 10% during the later Middle Ages (Goldthwaite, 2009 ). Other historians have also reconstructed implied interest rates from grain storage costs -between 12% (Brunt and Cannon, 1998) and 20% (McClosky and Nash, 1984) -and wool forward contracts -at 18%-22% per annum (Bell et al, 2006) . However, Domenico di Cambio, Datini's partner at Florence, may have slightly overestimated the profitability of such FX transactions when he asserted that 'I would rather earn 12% with our merchandise than 18% on exchange dealings' (Origo, 1957, p.147) . Here Domenico was asserting a moral position based on the association of some types of FX transactions with usury.
The consistency of these results between the different currency pairs and financial centres is striking and confirms that the time value of money was indeed incorporated into the spread between exchange rates at different centres. FX transactions could therefore have been used as credit instruments. At the same time, there was still a very considerable degree of uncertainty regarding the returns from any particular exchange and rechange transaction. In the case of 'cambium ad Venetias' examined above, some 18.5% of the transactions originating at Venice (142 of 769) and 9.4% of those at Florence (81 of 832) would have produced a negative return.
There was a degree of risk involved in such transactions and so merchants engaging in exchange and rechange could legitimately argue that they were not usurious, as their profits were not certain or fixed in advance.
Seasonality
These variations in implied interest rates also had a major seasonal component and can shed light on economic activities at the different financial centres and wider patterns of trade across
Europe. The average monthly interest rates for each of the currency pairs at each of our seven financial centres under study are shown in figures 4-10. There is a clear general pattern across all seven financial centres; interest rates tended to be higher in the summer and autumn than in the winter and spring. This may have been linked to pan-European economic flows as goods and specie flowed out of Europe to the East in the summer and the galleys fleets returned with their cargos in the spring. Alternatively, it may reflect the importance of the farming season in a still largely agrarian society. Equally striking are the differences in the seasonal patterns at the different centres. There is a remarkable degree of correlation between interest rates at the same centre across currency pairs. This suggests that the seasonal influences on the local money market were highly significant.
INSERT FIGURES 4-10
The quantitative evidence thus obtained from the exchange rates can be compared to the (near) contemporary description of the money market in Uzzano's (1442) merchant handbook. Uzzano has relatively little to say about Florence. His main comment is that money in Florence is always improving but he identifies September through to January as particularly good because annual payments were made in the countryside (presumably connected to the harvest), which money is then brought into the city and to the banks. Uzzano is often obscure and his precise meaning here is unclear. The graph of monthly interest rates shows a clear increase in the interest rate at
Florence over the summer, dropping after September and into the spring. This would fit in well with an increase in the money supply in Florence as farmers brought their harvest profits into the city. The other point to note about the graph of implicit interest rates at Florence is that there was much less seasonal variation than at the other centres. This may reflect Florence's prominence as a financial rather than trading centre. On the one hand that there was always ample liquidity available while, on the other hand, there were no periods of exceptional demand linked to fairs or the departure and arrival of trading fleets, as at Venice. The picture at Genoa is even less clear-cut and difficult to match with Uzzano's description.
By contrast, Uzzano's description of the Venetian money market is much clearer and more detailed:
In Venice money is expensive from May to 8th September, because of the outward bound galleys which leave in July, August and September. The reason why it gets more expensive is because everyone starts to make arrangements and they want to remit more there; and this higher cost is due to the amount of cash the galleys carry, because a great deal of merchandise is sold there at the time of the galleys, which must be paid for just when you have many demands on your purse -and a lot of money goes out of the banks in cash, so cash is always dear there by 1% more than usual. And money is highly priced for all places, and is offered there at various maturities. From 8th July money is highly priced, then there are no more maturities until 1st August, and in this month there is an expansion by ½ to 1%. From 1st August money starts to fluctuate, and is expensive continually until 8th September; and after the 8th all [payment terms] have become due, and all the galleys have gone, so there is no more demand -and the banks are quick to supply and money goes through the floor.
Uzzano (1442) The general picture here agrees with the exchange rate evidence -particularly in terms of the sharp increase in interest rates in August. Uzzano's figure of a 1% increase in interest rates in August should be annualized to a 12% jump, slightly lower than the increase observed here between July and August. This peak is followed by a sharp drop in September, October and November, before recovering in December and January. Uzzano links this resurgence to two factors: first, one of the main payment terms for goods purchased on credit in the summer was at Christmas, which increased the demand for money as merchants had to raise new credit (or roll-over their existing credit lines) to meet these obligations, and second, galleys for Catalonia and Flanders departed in January. One divergence from Uzzano's account is that interest rates remain depressed in May and June.
At Barcelona, the graph of monthly interest rates shows an increase over the summer, reaching a peak in October and November, and then dropping to its lowest point in April. This too confirms
Uzzano's description of the trends in the demand for money at Barcelona. Uzzano states that:
In Barcelona, money is dear from the first of June through all of August because of the investments in wool from Aragon and the surrounding valleys and because of the purchases of 'grain' [the dye] in Valencia; the money market tightens again in October, after St Luke's day, which is on the 18 th , because of the investments in saffron, when the dearness is even greater than in the wool season, and it will last until January; and from then on, money eases every day and the exchange rates return to their former level, and the easiness lasts until the wool season, unless something unexpected happens. (1968, p.88) In Northern Europe, Bruges and Paris were particularly closely-connected markets. At Paris, there were two distinct peaks in interest rates: the first in June and the second in October, At Bruges, there were similar twin peaks in July-August and November. In both cases, rates were at their lowest in February-March. The situation at Paris partly matches Uzzano's account. He identified two peaks in demand for money, both linked to fairs. The first was in June, which agrees with our data, but the second was not in October but rather December. The pattern at Bruges differs dramatically from Uzzano's description. According to him, demand for money peaked in December and January with the arrival of the galleys from Venice and dropped in August and September as merchants came to the fairs bringing ready cash and thus increasing the money supply. It is possibly that these discrepancies reflect changes in trading patterns between the period covered by the Datini letters and when Uzzano was writing.
Translated in de Roover
For London, we only have the rates based on FX exchange and rechange transactions with Bruges and Genoa, but they both tell the same story. Rates were low in the spring, began to rise after May and peaked in the autumn, before falling away again over the winter. Unfortunately, Uzzano does not report on the London money market in his handbook, but it is likely that the demand for money (and therefore interest rates) was tied to the wool-shearing and shipping season, as that was England's major export at this time.
Long term trends in interest rates
The preceding section has set out some new datasets for commercial interest rates during the middle ages. At the start, we identified a particular historical question on which this new evidence might shed some light; namely whether there was a break in interest rates around 1350? It has been argued that there was a long-term decline in the cost of capital (sometimes proxied by the return on landed investment or long-term annuities) after c.1350, falling from 10% to 5% per annum (Clark, 1988) . This has been based on annuities, rent charges and land prices. This general trend was also reflected in sovereign debt yields (Epstein, 2000; Stasavage, 2011) . We might expect a similar pattern with regard to commercial interest rates but the lack of detailed evidence about the interest rates charged on commercial loans in the middle ages has made it difficult to confirm or deny this hypothesis.
The interest rates that we have calculated above from exchange rates all date from the period 1383-1411. As we have seen, the interest rates varied depending on the location of the loan, the seasonality of the money market and the length of the loan. In general, the very short-term (onemonth) loans at the most advanced markets (Florence, Genoa and Venice) charged interest at the rate of around 9-10% per annum. Longer-term loans of four to six months between Italy and Northern Europe, Italy and Iberia and Iberia and Northern Europe tended to be slightly higher at around 12-16%. Unfortunately, it is more difficult to find equally reliable information from the period before 1350. It is rare to have exchange rates for both ends of the transaction, which makes it impossible to calculate profits using either of the methodologies used above. However, it is possible to work out shadow interest rates from some transactions.
In the thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries, the chief trading and exchange markets were the Champagne fairs. The annual fair cycle consisted of six fairs held roughly every two months.
The key difference from practice during the Datini years was that the length of exchange rate transactions was not based on set usance periods but tied into the settlement days at the end of each fair. 7 There are records of a number of bills of exchange payable at the Champagne fairs but we do not know the exchange rates at the fairs. Thomas Blomquist (1988, pp. 372-4) The best evidence for interest rates before 1350 was found by Mandich (1970) in the account books of the Covoni society of Florence. Between 1336 and 1340, Mandich found hundreds of exchange transactions between Florence and Venice. Some of these were definite examples of dry exchange without letters, where no money was actually transferred but the differences in exchange rates at Florence and Venice were used to calculate interest charges. For these thirtyeight transactions, the average interest rate was 17.2%. However, this is not strictly comparable with the rates calculated above since these loans were disproportionately made during the autumn, when exchange and interest rates were at their seasonal peaks, with fewer during the spring, when they were at their nadir. In other cases, the Covoni engaged in 'speculative exchange' by remitting money to Venice and then buying bills of exchange to remit this money back to Florence. They also used remittances from Venice to cover debts incurred by their branch at Padua. Extracting the exchange rates at Florence and Venice from all such transactions, and using the methodology set out above, as shown in table 5. We find that the implicit interest rate incorporated into the spread between exchange rates at Florence and Venice during these 7 In many ways, the sixteenth and seventeenth century fairs of Besancon, Lyons, Piacenza etc. were a return to the twelfth/thirteenth century practice.
years was around 15-16%. This is significantly higher than the 9-10% implied by the exchange rates between the same two places in the Datini letters some fifty years later.
INSERT TABLE 5
There are a number of difficulties in drawing comparisons between interest rates before and after 1350 as a result of the changing nature of the evidence. However, comparing the implicit interest rates incorporated within the exchange rates at Florence and Venice in the Covoni account book and the Datini letters, the figures above suggest that there may have been a slight fall in the interest rates charged on short-term commercial loans after c.1350 from c.15% to c.10% but that this was not of the same scale as the halving in the cost of capital. This can be easily explained; the cost of capital was only one of the factors determining the commercial rate of interest. Lenders also had to consider default risk and transaction costs. Even if the cost of capital component of interest rates fell after 1350, rates still remained high to cover these other two components.
Conclusion
Overall, we argue that the use of exchange rates to calculate implicit interest rates is a valuable tool. First, it dramatically increases the number of interest rate observations available to the historian. Second, it proves that interest rates were incorporated into exchange rates in a systematic way. Third, it also paints a consistent picture of commercial interest rates -10-15%
varying with place and term. This is comparable to the more scattered indications of returns on other forms of investment. Fourth, there was a high degree of variation in returns, which were not infrequently negative -justifying the non-usurious nature of these transactions. Fifth, the seasonal pattern of exchange and therefore interest rates also sheds light on the nature and timing of trade and financial flows around medieval Europe. Finally, the compilation of a larger and more internally consistent dataset enables the use of more sophisticated quantitative methods that can supplement the more qualitative evidence in other sources. For example, by comparing the implicit interest rates calculated from the Datini letters with those obtained by applying the same methodology to the Covoni account books, it is possible to demonstrate a sharp drop in commercial interest rates at some point between 1340 and 1380. D indicates date from drawing of the bill while S indicates days after sight (presentation of the bill). In the latter case, the number in brackets shows the average usance period taking into account the mean postal time. 
